Steven Keil was formerly Senior Fellow at GMF.

Keil has an extensive analytical track record at the intersection of U.S. national security, regional European security, and Russian foreign policy. He has advised and briefed numerous policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic, and his work has been featured in outlets like Defense One, Defense News, the National Interest, The Hill, and Just Security, among others. 

Keil received his bachelor’s from the University of South Dakota in political science, German, and history and holds a master’s degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service BMW Center of German and European Studies. He speaks German and basic Russian. 

Media Mentions

Ukraine has basically tried to make the argument that we're not just fighting for ourselves, we're fighting for Europe as well, and kind of the broader national security, particularly as it relates to Atlantic security.
[Soviet-era arms is] what they inherited after the end of the Cold War. It makes up a bulk of their own military capacity.
It would have been hard to imagine Germany doing these things and saying these things even two months prior. But what was a significant shift for Germany wasn’t necessarily enough for the rest of the trans-Atlantic community.
I think if you take Putin at his word, the consequences could be significantly dire. [A no-fly zone] would be essentially perceived as a direct intervention in the conflict by NATO, and likely to receive that kind of response by Russia.
To the extent President Trump's rhetoric around NATO helped increase defense spending, it was likely more out of a fear that the US commitment to European security was faltering rather than a positive reinforcement of mutual commitments to the Alliance and Euro-Atlantic security.
[Sanctions against Russia] show that it is a politically difficult problem in Germany. If Scholz failed to collaborate with his allies, the crisis would deepen and Germany's leadership would decline.
Translated from Japanese