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Andrew Small is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF's Asia Program, which he established in 2006. His research focuses on U.S.–China relations, Europe–China relations, Chinese policy in South Asia, and broader developments in China's foreign and economic policy. He was based in GMF’s Brussels office for five years, and worked before that as the director of the Foreign Policy Centre's Beijing office, as a visiting fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and an ESU scholar in the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy.

His articles and papers have been published in The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Washington Quarterly, as well as many other journals, magazines, and newspapers. He is the author of the book The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics published with Hurst / Oxford University Press in 2015. Small was educated at Balliol College, University of Oxford.

To contact him, please email [email protected].

Media Mentions

The unpredictability is going to be absolutely endemic for anyone—official or private sector—who’s operating in Afghanistan.
The combination of the kind of language used by the G7 and (China's formal inclusion) in NATO strategic documents is indeed a blow for (China), and something that they would have hoped and wished to be able to prevent.
China had spent about $25 billion on CPEC by mid-2020, but that investment was already pushing the upper limits of the project, instead of being the base for a 'more ambitious plan.'
It’s certainly the worst security situation China has faced in Pakistan since the late 2000s but now the economic presence is far greater and so there’s far more at stake for both sides.
China has been reluctant to have formal alliances that would essentially be treaty obligations — the only formal alliance it has is with North Korea but even that it treats as an aberrational case that it's slightly embarrassed about.
China thought that this would be successful and whatever was done... They hadn't expected it to drag out in the manner that it has, they hadn't expected the level of resilience on Ukraine's part, they hadn't expected Russia to be as ineffective as it has been, and I think they had also not expected to be called out for what they were doing to the level that they were.
The close Sino-Russian relationship means the impact of sanctions against Russia extends to China.
I think China will at least be disappointed and frustrated as they had counted on Russia to do better than this. They think Russia misjudged this and pulled China in — but it was their decision. If you hadn't had months of build up for this, you hadn't had people warning China, you hadn't had the level of the massing of troops on Ukraine's border, then you could've said China was tricked into it.
Pakistan should be one of the biggest winners from China’s rise as a global power. But if its internal security deteriorates or if Chinese anxieties about the country’s political direction worsen, it will be a great lost opportunity for the country.
Over the past few weeks, we've seen a lot of statements from European leaders expressing their concern about China's budding relationship with Russia. Regardless, EU leaders are increasingly aware of the need to bring about long-term rebalancing in its relations with China, as the Russian invasion has made EU nations realize the risks of dependence on authoritarian states that make military threats to their neighbors.
The current US measures against Moscow also have another goal, although the main purpose is of course to make Putin pay the price, but the secondary purpose is to warn China of the possible consequences of any military action against Taiwan.
Translated from Chinese (Mandarin)
China seems unwilling to take any steps beyond expressing the desire for peace, as it wants to avoid directly interfering with what Russia wants to do. I think the sense is still they would give Russia the space to do what it wants... China is not comfortable leaning on Russia, and I think they would question whether it would be successful.
I think the sense is still [China] would give Russia the space to do what it wants.
Putin may have done this anyway, but also it was unquestionably an enabling backdrop that was provided by the joint statement, the visit and Xi’s association with all of these things.
[China had hoped for a government in Afghanistan that, although Taliban-dominated, could] tick enough boxes with the international community [to achieve diplomatic recognition.]
China has had some bad experiences and is aware of the political and economic risks of the deteriorating financial situation in many countries. So they are lending less.
Translated from French
This ushers in a more competitive era in development aid. The recipient countries will now have an alternative to Chinese money. It is up to the EU to prove that its aid is better.
[This] marked the first serious effort from the European side to put packages together and figure out financing mechanisms, so countries considering taking loans from China have an alternative option.
China has limited means to coerce Lithuania economically. It could attempt to expand the pressure it extends towards the EU as a whole…but the risks of that backfiring are enormous, particularly given the deterioration in China-EU ties in recent years.
Translated from Chinese (Mandarin)
The Taliban have sought to avoid embarrassment with China as a result of any Uyghur militant activities, but it would be a very different matter if they actually handed them over.
Views differ within the bloc, but everyone agrees on some difficult policy areas, such as sanctioning Chinese officials for their repressive practices in Xinjiang.
China has since scaled back its efforts. The Covid-19 crisis has come and gone, and major projects are not without political and diplomatic consequences.
Translated from French
En effet, la nouvelle initiative américano-britanico-australienne est définie très précisément et étroitement comme un partenariat militaire et sécuritaire, puisqu’il s’agit de collaborer dans les domaines des sous-marins, du cyberespace, de l’informatique quantique et de l’intelligence artificielle.
The lines are blurred on China’s part between who constitutes a terrorist and who constitutes someone who has simply been politically active.
In Afghanistan, no EU state was able to operate without U.S. support, not even the U.K.
Beijing will be happy to dangle promises and engage in talks on the BRI and CPEC extensions, but will not move ahead with anything on the ground until they are confident of political and security conditions.
China is now seeing all of this as intertwined and part of a more adverse shift in the Pakistan and Afghanistan context.
[China] tends to see Afghanistan as a trap and will be wary about taking on too prominent a role there.
It’s not clear why China should have anything to do with [Afghanistan], let alone why China should be having friendly relations with a government that behaved and continues to behave in the manner that the Taliban does.
I think China’s still sees Afghanistan as kind of a wild west environment. It is not one that I think they want to see as some kind of fabulously interconnected hub for the entire region.
China does think the U.S. will have to count on it more in Afghanistan in [the] future, and they’re [also] attempting to couple it with climate change...