Andrew Small is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF's Asia Program, which he established in 2006. His research focuses on U.S.–China relations, Europe–China relations, Chinese policy in South Asia, and broader developments in China's foreign and economic policy. He was based in GMF’s Brussels office for five years, and worked before that as the director of the Foreign Policy Centre's Beijing office, as a visiting fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and an ESU scholar in the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy.

His articles and papers have been published in The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Washington Quarterly, as well as many other journals, magazines, and newspapers. He is the author of the book The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics published with Hurst / Oxford University Press in 2015. Small was educated at Balliol College, University of Oxford.

To contact him, please email [email protected].

Media Mentions

China has had some bad experiences and is aware of the political and economic risks of the deteriorating financial situation in many countries. So they are lending less.
Translated from French
This ushers in a more competitive era in development aid. The recipient countries will now have an alternative to Chinese money. It is up to the EU to prove that its aid is better.
[This] marked the first serious effort from the European side to put packages together and figure out financing mechanisms, so countries considering taking loans from China have an alternative option.
China has limited means to coerce Lithuania economically. It could attempt to expand the pressure it extends towards the EU as a whole…but the risks of that backfiring are enormous, particularly given the deterioration in China-EU ties in recent years.
Translated from Chinese (Mandarin)
The Taliban have sought to avoid embarrassment with China as a result of any Uyghur militant activities, but it would be a very different matter if they actually handed them over.
Views differ within the bloc, but everyone agrees on some difficult policy areas, such as sanctioning Chinese officials for their repressive practices in Xinjiang.
China has since scaled back its efforts. The Covid-19 crisis has come and gone, and major projects are not without political and diplomatic consequences.
Translated from French
En effet, la nouvelle initiative américano-britanico-australienne est définie très précisément et étroitement comme un partenariat militaire et sécuritaire, puisqu’il s’agit de collaborer dans les domaines des sous-marins, du cyberespace, de l’informatique quantique et de l’intelligence artificielle.
The lines are blurred on China’s part between who constitutes a terrorist and who constitutes someone who has simply been politically active.
In Afghanistan, no EU state was able to operate without U.S. support, not even the U.K.
Beijing will be happy to dangle promises and engage in talks on the BRI and CPEC extensions, but will not move ahead with anything on the ground until they are confident of political and security conditions.
China is now seeing all of this as intertwined and part of a more adverse shift in the Pakistan and Afghanistan context.
[China] tends to see Afghanistan as a trap and will be wary about taking on too prominent a role there.
It’s not clear why China should have anything to do with [Afghanistan], let alone why China should be having friendly relations with a government that behaved and continues to behave in the manner that the Taliban does.
I think China’s still sees Afghanistan as kind of a wild west environment. It is not one that I think they want to see as some kind of fabulously interconnected hub for the entire region.
China does think the U.S. will have to count on it more in Afghanistan in [the] future, and they’re [also] attempting to couple it with climate change...