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Noah Barkin is a visiting senior fellow in the Asia Program based in Berlin. He specializes in Europe’s relationship with China and the implications of China’s rise for the transatlantic relationship.

Noah is also managing editor in the China practice at Rhodium Group. Prior to joining GMF, Noah had a 25-year career as a journalist in Berlin, Paris, London, and New York. His work has appeared on Reuters, where he served as a bureau chief, regional news editor, and roving Europe correspondent, as well as in The New York TimesThe AtlanticForeign Policy, and Politico, among other publications. In 2019 he was a visiting fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies in Washington. He is also a host on KCRW, an NPR-affiliated radio station in Berlin, and the author of a book on the euro. A native Californian, Noah has a bachelor's degree in political science and French from UC Berkeley and a master's in international affairs from Columbia University.

 

Media Mentions

The days of win-win EU-China meetings, where the differences are papered over, and half-baked agreements are held up as deliverables, are long gone. China is adjusting to a new reality in which the EU is raising all the contentious issues in the relationship every time they meet. It would prefer to avoid this.
The days of win-win EU-China meetings, where the differences are papered over and half-baked agreements are held up as deliverables, are long gone. China is adjusting to a new reality in which the EU is raising all the contentious issues in the relationship every time they meet. It would prefer to avoid this.
The economic upheaval triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is likely to reinforce the reluctance of some capitals to push back too hard against Beijing. But there is no going back to the old days.
There are risks to Scholz on the left and right. But he’s created facts on the ground now, and there will be huge pressure to support him.
It is mistaken to think that Europe can play the role of mediator in the US-China conflict. Neither the US nor China has any appetite for this. And European member states are too divided on where they stand in this superpower standoff.
The EU is right to focus on Africa after many years of expanding Chinese influence on the continent. But it will take more than feel-good pledges to make a difference.
Translated from German
If European companies pull out of Lithuania because of this Chinese coercion, then Beijing will have won and the lesson it will draw from this is that it can pressure European countries to tow its red lines.
The language on China is the strongest ever to appear in a German coalition agreement, reflecting growing concerns about the direction of China under Xi Jinping. The mentions of issues considered to be 'red lines' by the ruling Chinese Communist Party shows a readiness to speak more openly about differences with Beijing.
Lithuania’s stance, and China’s response to it, has helped force this issue onto the European agenda. There is still a reluctance to provoke Beijing on one of the reddest of its red lines. But there is also a realisation that Europe cannot leave Lithuania out there, blowing in the wind. And there is a growing conviction that Europe cannot allow Beijing to define what its ‘One China’ policy looks like.
The Commission seems to be missing someone who can cut through the Brussels turf wars and produce a strategic document that isn't just a compilation of tired EU buzzwords. It shows that there is still a deep-seated institutional reluctance to tackle the challenges posed by China head on.
Translated from German
At the same time as the EU is trumpeting a new geostrategic approach to connectivity, it is co-financing a major study with China of rail routes that appear tailor made for Beijing and its Belt and Road ambitions.
Translated from German
Throughout the campaign, Laschet has reduced the debate over China policy to a simplistic choice between pursuing robust economic ties or speaking out on human rights and seeing those ties suffer. This is precisely how Beijing would like Germany and other countries to define their choice.

The Shanghai port visit was a late addition to the deployment in order to appease doves in Berlin who worried it would be overly provocative towards China.