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Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, senior fellow, joined GMF part-time in September 2020, while also remaining a senior fellow with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Washington, DC-based macroeconomic thinktank he has been employed by since 2002. Before 2002, Jacob worked with the Danish Ministry of Defense, the United Nations in Iraq, and in the private financial sector. He is a graduate of the Danish Army's Special School of Intelligence and Linguistics with the rank of first lieutenant; the University of Aarhus in Aarhus, Denmark; the Columbia University in New York; and received his PhD from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. Jacob’s current research focuses on European economies and structural and institutional reform, the macroeconomic impact of climate change and climate mitigation, U.S.-EU-China economic competition, immigration, foreign direct investment trends and estimations, fiscal and monetary policy, pension systems, and demographic trends.

 

 

Media Mentions

If the administration is unable to get this through Congress – their signature international agreement – this would be devastating for the Treasury’s international credentials.
Brussels faces no political consequences from potentially rationing gas, but it can be deadly to a national government. Many member states have also diversified away from Russian gas, while Germany of course has not, and politically must pay a price.
And now there is a "very strong risk" that Moscow will do the same to the entire continent and completely cut off gas supplies before winter.
Russia has already stopped sending gas to Finland, Poland and Bulgaria over their refusal to pay in roubles. And now there is a “very strong risk” that Moscow will follow suit with the whole continent and cut gas supplies completely before the winter
Gazprom, Russia’s gas monopoly, cut deliveries in June, and if they are reduced further, German industries may soon confront fuel shortages that will compel them to scale back. I don’t think there are that many other European countries that have to do that.
As such, in my opinion, over the medium and long run (Croatia) will benefit from much lower levels of inflation, monetary stability, lower interest rates and of course the political influence that being a member of the euro gives you relatively to not being a member.
And it is clear that the Russian invasion has led to a more general EU re-evaluation of its economic relationship also with China, especially in Germany. ... There is an unwillingness now to become similarly dependent on Chinese market access, as has been the case with Russian energy. This will greatly benefit Lithuania in garnering the full support of the EU in confronting China.
If approved, this would be a strong move by Chancellor Olaf Scholz as it would put Germany on par with Europe’s biggest weapons suppliers for Ukraine.
This highlights how Russia’s atrocious actions in Ukraine have forced previous neutral countries to commit fully to NATO in the ‘you are either fully with us, or we will not protect you.
The war came at a time when Europe and the United States were enjoying a tremendous recovery.
Translated from Greek
Often under these type of sanctions, cultural items are exempt because they are non-pecuniary and they are not related directly to the war effort.
There will be investor lawsuits. They will go after Russian government assets in Western jurisdictions. So, this could potentially be a further isolation of the Russian economy in general.
The Russian government would, in my opinion, be compelled to start printing large amounts of new roubles with the risk of inciting significant additional inflation in Russia.
Chancellor Scholz, in my opinion, made a terrible strategic move by ruling out energy sanctions because he basically invited this action by Putin. Now, either he’s going to have to break existing sanctions [by dealing in Russian currency] or he’s going to have to do what he didn’t want to do before, namely, stop – or de facto stop – energy exports. Putin is basically forcing Germany to choose between potentially getting no gas or breaking the sanctions.
The damage is done. But at least the war finally may have shamed the relevant national governments into ending this corrupt practice.
[New Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s] forceful policy shifts are a firm repudiation of the core of Merkel’s foreign economic policy.
[An important question will be whether Russia retaliates by banning G-7 exports to Russia.] If so, Russia would ironically be helping isolate itself further and reduce trade with the West.
The war happened right at a time when Europe and the US had a recovery that was going really well. Projections in Europe were among the highest...(in) the last 20 years.
After the American and British moves on their gas and oil imports, the political costs to Germany of blocking the embargo against Russia and a joint loan to move towards energy independence are, in my view, unsustainable.
I don't think Russia will be exporting much oil and gas two weeks from now, I think the politics of that will move very fast.
[New measures to increase asylum budget] is billions and will require more EU funds as we are talking about an EU decision about EU borders.
There is the EU’s arrival on the scene as a funder of lethal weaponry for a nation at war, a quantum leap beyond anything we have seen.
[This development] could force companies to have two separate supply chains to serve each one.
Export controls on technology might directly impact Russia's military if a protracted conflict left it short of the chips that go into missiles.
I actually think it's a strategically wise move by Macron because all public polling in France suggests that the vast majority, more than two-thirds of the French people, support him in this tough line against the unvaccinated anti-vaxxers.
The legacy of the pandemic is that we really know now that if the crisis is big enough then common European debt might at least be part of the solution and my bet come two, three, four years from now [is] the climate situation will reach that political level.
The demands of the Russian government are totally unacceptable, it will probably come down to an ultimatum.
Translated from German
[It’s] not just about being vaccinated, having something stuck — a needle stuck in your shoulder, but telling the [German] government that you're not vaccinated. There are obvious historical reasons for that.
We are still in the window of opportunity until, say, May or June, after which I guess the midterms kill prospects for congressional passage, which the rest of the world will not appreciate.
The EU may just move forward without a pan-European leader like Merkel, who needed a few years and specific conditions to grow into that role herself. Historically, it’s the norm to be without anyone in that role. We probably won’t see another major European leader who stays in office for more than eight years, let alone 16, as was the case with Merkel.
We got this scientific miracle. We had a vaccine that was available six to nine months earlier than anybody had really believed in 2020...What that meant was that the second half of 2021 saw basically a general reopening in all of the advanced economies, and that certainly was a massive positive surprise.
Companies want an open trading system that has a degree of predictability. They may not like a 15% tax, but they understand that the status quo is not on offer. The alternative is infinitely worse.
It is 'the right decision' for both environmental and political reasons if the commission announces that nuclear is relatively clean.
[Putin] needs to sell. Yes, he may be playing the European gas markets but he is also responding to his own weakness… He does not have an interest in forcing an accelerated decarbonisation in Europe.
It’s like using your credit card and then not paying the bill at the end of the month. It’s political malpractice.
“I think the outcome of the [German] election was that broadly pro-European parties did very well. I mean, it was the far-left and the far-right that lost significantly, and then you had a shift from the incumbent CDU to the more pro-European, at least in fiscal terms, Greens and the SPD.
[The ongoing energy crisis] makes it even more important that the Spanish government finds other sources of financing.
The United States got a free pass over the summer, even as the situation in many parts of the country deteriorated dramatically.